ShanghaiTech SEM Working Paper No. 2021-003
School of Entrepreneurship and Management, ShanghaiTech University
I study a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one receiver, after observing signal structures of prior senders and their realizations. I develop a geometric method, recursive concavification, to characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium paths. I show that if there are two senders who have constant-sum payoffs, the truth-telling signal structure is always supported in equilibrium. I prove the existence of the silent equilibrium, where at most one sender provides nontrivial information. I also provide a sufficient condition under which it is without loss of generality to focus on silent equilibria.
Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Multiple Senders, Subgame Perfect
Date Written: May 8, 2021
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3841869
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