讲座时间:2021年11月24日 10:00- 11:30am
讲座地点:线上会议
https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/3RVwhh7AHjBX
会议 ID:620 943 867
讲座嘉宾:柯荣住教授(浙江大学)
讲座内容简介:
We develop a new method to rank information systems in moral hazard principal-agent problems. We show a necessary and sufficient condition for ranking the efficiency of signals without the first-order approach, that is, a convex-linear order based on the global likelihood ratio. According to the new theory, the Holmstrom's sufficient statistic criterion remains valid. However, the Kim mean-preserving spread criterion is not robust when the first-order approach is not valid. We thus propose several new criteria that are robust under the global incentive compatibility constraint. In particular, we show that the necessity of the well-known Blackwell criterion comes back when the signals are single-dimensional and satisfy the monotone likelihood property.
讲座嘉宾简介:
柯荣住,麻省理工学院经济学博士,浙江大学经济学院教授,浙江大学“文科领军人才”特聘教授,博士生导师。研究领域为微观经济学、契约理论及组织经济学。目前已在Journal of Labor Economics, Operations Research, Theoretical Economics,Management Science,SIAM Journal on Optimization等国际权威经济管理专业杂志上等发表文章。也曾在《中国社会科学季刊》(香港)、《中国社会科学评论》(香港)、《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学季刊》等权威中文杂志上发表20多篇文章。曾主持香港政府研究局、浙江省社科办等资助的课题多项;曾参与国家自然科学基金项目、杰出青年科学基金项目,教育部重点课题,浙江省社会科学重大课题,国家体改办体改研究会等研究项目10多项。